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Abstract
We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a
country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions, each
comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain
autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on
the neighboring district, there is underprovision of public goods in
both the city and the village. When districts consolidate, underpro-
vision persists in the village (and may even become more severe),
whereas overprovision of public goods arises in the city as urbanites
use their political power to exploit the villagers. From a social welfare
point of view, inhabitants of the village have insufficient incentives to
vote for consolidation. We examine how national transfers to local
governments can resolve these problems.
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1 Introduction
Inhabitants of villages that are located close by a city usually benefit con-
siderably from the services provided by the city. Many villagers work in the
city. Moreover, they often find the city a good place to spend their leisure
time. In as far as public services are concerned, the costs of services provided
by the city are commonly completely borne by the inhabitants of the city.
As inhabitants of cities usually benefit to a much smaller extent from the
services provided in villages than villagers benefit from cities’ services, rep-
resentatives of cities have claimed that the distribution of the tax burden is
unfair. Moreover, the interjurisdictional spillover effects of public good pro-
vision may give rise to severe underprovision as voters in the city do not take
into account the benefits of the city’s public good provision on the welfare of
the villagers. The same holds for the public good provision in the village in
as far as urbanites benefit from public good provision in the village.
A natural policy response to these problems is to unify cities and villages.
Unsurprisingly, inhabitants of villages often fiercely oppose consolidation as
it entails a large tax increase. Villagers claim that the only goal of consolida-
tion is to relieve the financial problems of the city. Moreover, they fear that
their interests will be ignored because they constitute a minority in political
decision-making bodies after consolidation. Consequently, public good pro-
vision in the village may be reduced. When villagers have the right to decide
on whether to consolidate with a city or not, consolidation will therefore be
a rare event.
This paper studies how national transfers to local governments can resolve
these problems. We analyze a simple model of local public good provision
in a country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions. Each
region consists of two districts that differ in size, a city and a village. The
city and the village either form one municipality or they remain autonomous.
We assume that consolidation requires the consent of a majority of voters in
both the city and in the village. In line with earlier studies, we find that when
districts remain autonomous, there is underprovision of local public goods
in both districts. Underprovision of public goods in the village persists after
consolidation, and may even become more severe. In the city, consolidation
results in overprovision of public goods, as the urbanites start exploiting the
villagers. We also show that from a social welfare point of view, voters in
the village have insufficient incentives to vote for consolidation.
We consider the effects of two types of national transfers: an earmarked
transfer that increases with local public good provision and a lump-sum
transfer to municipalities that is independent of population size. An ear-
marked subsidy helps to mitigate the underprovision problem. A lump-sum
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tax strengthens the incentives for consolidation. Heterogeneity between re-
gions causes neither of these transfers to attain the first-best. Earmarked
transfers promote welfare as they increase public goods provision in au-
tonomous districts, but exacerbate the problem of overprovision of public
goods in cities that merged with a village. Moreover, even when all districts
remain autonomous, differences in the size of the spillover effect between re-
gions cause earmarked transfers to result in overprovision in some regions,
while underprovision persists in other regions. A lump-sum tax that is in-
dependent of population size promotes consolidation in regions where it is
socially desirable, but also in regions where districts can better remain au-
tonomous. The optimal lump-sum transfer as well as the optimal earmarked
transfer entail a trade off between these desired and undesired effects and
crucially depend on the exact distribution of relative population sizes and
spillover effects over regions.
Transfers from national governments to local governments are widespread.
For instance, in The Netherlands, about 7% of the national government bud-
get is transferred to local governments through the ’Gemeentefonds’. Parts
of these transfers are earmarked. In Germany, the ’Gemeindefinanzierungs-
gesetz’ arranges the transfers from the ’La¨nder’ to the ’Kommunen’. In Swe-
den, local governments receive general grants and equalization grants from
the ’staten’. In the US, towns receive intergovernmental grants from the
federal government, from the state, and from the county.
The economics literature gives little attention to the effect of transfers
on incentives for consolidation.1 One reason is that most papers on political
geography focus on formation of countries rather than on consolidation of
local jurisdictions. Related to the present paper are Alesina and Spolaore
(1997), Bolton and Roland (1996, 1997), and Goyal and Staal (2004).2 In
contrast to the present analysis, these papers assume that centralized policy
is uniform. Our set-up is close to Besley and Coate (2003), who study the
merits of centralized provision of local public goods when provision need not
be uniform across jurisdictions. The main differences between our paper and
theirs is that we endogenize the decision on centralization and that we allow
for transfers from a higher-level government.
Three other papers are close to our analysis. First, Calabrese, Cassidy,
and Epple (2002) develop a computational model to study the effects of and
1There is, however, a large literature on intergovernmental transfers where jurisdictional
boundaries are taken as given, most prominently Oates (1972), Gordon (1983), Persson and
Tabellini (1996), Dixit and Londregan (1998), and Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau
(1998). For a survey, see Oates (1999).
2For a survey of the literature on the size of countries, see Bolton, Roland and Spolaore
(1996).
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political support for municipal consolidation. Their main focus is on local
redistributive policies and housing prices. Ellingsen (1998) studies the effects
of inter- and intra-regional heterogeneity in preferences and the relative size of
regions on political integration. Heterogeneity in preferences between regions
also plays a key role in Lockwood (2002). None of these papers examines the
role of transfers from a national government.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Next, in section 3.1, we derive the socially optimal amounts of local public
goods. Section 3.2 examines the outcome of voting on public good provision,
when districts are autonomous and when they are consolidated. Section
3.3 derives the conditions under which districts decide to consolidate. In
section 3.4, these conditions are compared with the conditions for socially
optimal consolidation. Section 4 examines the effects of national transfers to
municipalities. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a country consisting of many regions. Each region consists of two
districts (cities, villages). Districts in a region differ from each other in
population size; otherwise they are identical. The population size of district
i in region j is denoted by αij. Inhabitants of a district are homogenous and
immobile.
Districts in a region either form one municipality or two separate munic-
ipalities. Forming one municipality requires majority support in each of the
districts. A municipality is responsible for the provision of local pure public
goods. Decisions on public goods provision are taken by majority rule. The
amount of public goods provided in district i in region j is denoted by gij.
Public goods provided in a district have positive spillover effects on the other
district in the region. The utility function of an inhabitant of district i in
region j is:
Uij =
√
gij + κj
√
g−ij + y − tij (1)
where g−ij is the amount of public goods provided in the other district in
region j, κj ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of spillovers in region j, y denotes
the before-tax private income per capita, and tij is a local lump-sum tax.
Note that we abstract from income heterogeneity. Further, we assume that
public goods and private goods are separable in the utility function and that
taxes are nondistortionary. A convenient implication is that we can omit y.
We will discuss some of the consequences of these assumptions along the way
and in the concluding section.
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The cost of a public good is equal to p units of private goods. Public
goods are financed by local lump-sum taxes, tij, and by transfers from the
central government to the local governments, f(·). The latter may depend
on, e.g., the population size of the municipality and on the amount of public
goods provided. If districts in region j are two separate municipalities, the
local government’s budget constraint reads:
pgij = f (·) + tijαij (2)
If districts in region j form one municipality, the budget constraint is:
p (gij + g−ij) = f (·) + tj (αij + α−ij) (3)
Note that we impose the condition that the per capita taxes within a munic-
ipality are uniform across districts.
3 Local public good provision and municipal
consolidation
We structure our analysis as follows. First, we derive the socially optimal
levels of local public goods. Next, we analyze political decision making and
contrast the outcomes with the normative benchmark. The political decision
making process consists of two stages. First, voters in each district vote on
whether to consolidate with the neighboring district into one municipality
or to remain autonomous. Next, there is a vote on the amount(s) of pub-
lic goods in each municipality. For the moment, we abstract from central
funding, f(·) = 0. In section 4, we study national transfers aimed at improv-
ing the allocative efficiency of local public good provision in heterogenous
regions. Since we abstract from interregional spillovers, and inhabitants are
immobile, we restrict attention in this section to public goods provision and
consolidation of municipalities in a particular region. For convenience, we
drop the subscript j, and we denote the larger district in the region as the
city (c) and the smaller district as the village (v), αc > αv.
3.1 Social optimum
We define the social optimum as the outcome that maximizes the unweighted
sum of utilities of all individuals in the region:
max
gc,gv
αc (
√
gc + κ
√
gv) + αv (
√
gv + κ
√
gc)− pgc − pgv (4)
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The social surplus maximizing public good levels (gsc , g
s
v) that result from
this optimization problem are:
gsc =
(
αc + καv
2p
)2
(5)
gsv =
(
αv + καc
2p
)2
(6)
Hence, the socially optimal amount of public goods in each district increases
in the population size of both districts, increases in the size of the spillover
effect, and decreases in the cost of public goods provision.
3.2 Voting on public goods provision
First consider the case where districts remain autonomous. Recall that voters
are homogenous within districts. Hence, the outcome of voting in district i is
found by maximizing (1) with respect to gi subject to the budget constraint
(2). The equilibrium levels of public goods (gac , g
a
v) are:
gac =
(
αc
2p
)2
(7)
gav =
(
αv
2p
)2
(8)
Clearly, local public goods are underprovided when districts are autonomous
[compare (7) and (8) with (5) and (6), respectively]. The reason is that
voters in each district do not take into account the positive spillover effect of
public goods on welfare in the other district. Underprovision is more severe
for larger spillover effects and for a larger population size of the neighboring
district.
When districts consolidate into one municipality, the inhabitants of the
city are in a majority and, therefore, gc and gv are set according to their
wishes. Maximizing (1) with respect to gc and gv subject to the budget
constraint (3) results in:
guc =
(
αc + αv
2p
)2
(9)
guv =
(
κ (αc + αv)
2p
)2
(10)
consolidation results in overprovision of public goods in the city, whereas
underprovision of public goods in the village persists and may become even
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more severe than under autonomy [compare (9) and (10) with (5) and (6) and
with (7) and (8), respectively]. The intuition is clear. Consolidation broadens
the tax base. Hence, the per capita tax per unit of public good is lower. This
induces inhabitants of the city (the decisive voters) to increase the amount of
public goods provided in their district. Since they do not take into account
the tax cost to the inhabitants of the village, and the villagers benefit less
from public goods provided in the city than the urbanites, public goods pro-
vision in the city is higher than socially optimal. The effect of consolidation
on the amount of public goods provided in the village is ambiguous. On the
one hand, the per capita tax per unit of public good decreases, resulting in
an increase in the amount of public goods provided. This effect is larger for a
larger population size of the city. On the other hand, it is the urbanites, not
the villagers, who decide on public goods provision after consolidation. This
reduces the amount of public goods provided in the village as urbanites care
less about the public goods in the village than do the villagers. This effect
is larger for a smaller spillover effect. Comparing (10) with (8), it follows
that consolidation increases public goods supply in the village if κ > αv
αc+αv
.
Hence, public goods supply in the village increases if the spillover effect or
the relative population size of the city is sufficiently large. Since αv < αc,
κ ≥ 1
2
is a sufficient condition. In all cases, underprovision of public goods
persists in the village as inhabitants of the city care less than the inhabitants
of the village about public goods supply in the village [compare (10) with
(6)].
Lastly, it is easily verified that the per capita tax is always higher when
districts consolidate than when they remain autonomous and - in the latter
case - that the tax in the city is higher than the tax in the village:
tuv = t
u
c =
(
1 + κ2
) αc + αv
4p
> tac =
αc
4p
> tav =
αv
4p
Clearly, when public and private goods would not be separable in the utility
function, this need not be the case because income effects come into play.
3.3 Voting on municipal consolidation
In each district, there is a vote on whether to consolidate with the neighboring
district into one municipality or to remain autonomous. Using the results
from the previous subsection, urbanites favor consolidation if:(
1 + κ2
) αc + αv
2p
>
αc
4p
+ κ
αv
2p
Unsurprisingly, this condition is always satisfied. Consolidation benefits the
inhabitants of the city as it brings about a broader tax base and the right to
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Figure 1: Vote on municipal consolidation
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Figure 1: Vote on municipal consolidation.
decide on the level of gv. Villagers favor consolidation if:(
4κ− κ2 − 1
) αc + αv
4p
>
αv
4p
+ κ
αc
2p
Rewriting yields: (
4κ− κ2 − 2
)
αv >
(
1 + κ2 − 2κ
)
αc (11)
The right-hand side is positive for all values of κ between zero and unity. The
left-hand side is negative when κ ∈ [0, 2 − √2). Hence, when the spillover
effect is small, villagers oppose consolidation for any values of αv and αc. For
κ > 2−√2, we can write the condition as:
αv
αc
>
1 + κ2 − 2κ
4κ− κ2 − 2 (12)
This condition is depicted in Figure 1.
Since αv/αc < 1, consolidation can only be in the villager’s interest if
κ > 3/2 − 1
2
√
3. The villagers’ incentive to consolidate becomes stronger
as the spillover effect is larger. The intuition is clear. After consolidation,
public goods provision reflects the wishes of the urbanites. When spillovers
are small, consolidation reduces the level of public goods that are provided
in the village while the tax burden increases as villagers now have to pay for
the public goods provided in the city. In addition, when spillovers are small,
villagers benefit little from the increase in public goods supply in the city.
When spillovers are larger, consolidation may increase public goods provision
in the village and villagers benefit to a larger extent from the increase in
public goods provision in the city. If spillovers are sufficiently large, the
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welfare gain from the increase in public goods compensates for the increase
in the tax.
More surprisingly, provided that κ > 2−√2, the incentive to consolidate
increases in the relative size of the village, while the reverse holds when
κ < 2−√2. Two effects, working in opposite directions, play a role.
First, the villagers must pay for the public goods that are provided in the
city when they decide to consolidate, while they can free ride on the city’s tax
payers when they remain autonomous. The larger is the city’s population
size, the larger is the tax increase for the villagers. A larger population
size in the city thus weakens the incentive to consolidate. Consolidation,
however, also increases the amount of public goods provided in the city as
it broadens the tax base. This effect increases in the population size of the
village. If κ < 1
2
, the positive effect of higher public good provision in the
city on villagers’ utility does not compensate for the accompanied increase
in the tax burden. Then, a larger population size in the village reduces
the incentive to consolidate. If κ > 1
2
, the villagers’ benefit from increased
public good provision in the city is larger than the utility loss from the tax
increase. Then, a larger population size in the village makes it more likely
that villagers support consolidation.
Second, for any value of κ, a higher population size in the city promotes
consolidation as it becomes more likely that public goods provision in the
village increases. In contrast, the more populous the village, the weaker
the incentive to consolidate. When the village is large, the level of public
goods under autonomy is already high and, hence, it becomes less likely that
consolidation results in an increase in public goods provision in the village.
Taking the two effects together, it follows that the incentive to consolidate
decreases in the relative size of the village when spillovers are small (κ <
2−√2), while the reverse holds when spillovers are large (κ > 2−√2).
3.4 Socially optimal consolidation
Consolidation is only in the villagers’ interest when spillovers are large and
the village is not too small relative to the city. An important question is under
what conditions consolidation brings us closer to the social optimum. In other
words, do villagers have sufficient incentives to vote for consolidation from a
social welfare point of view? Comparing social welfare under autonomy and
consolidation, we find that consolidation raises welfare if:
α2v
(
2− 4κ+ κ2
)
− κ2α2c < 0
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κ
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Figure 2: Social optimality and political feasibility
of municipal consolidation.
1/2 3/2-√3/2
consolidation is socially optimal, 
but not politically feasible
αv/αc
Figure 2: Social optimality and political feasibility of municipal consolida-
tion.
When κ > 2−√2, the first term is negative and, hence, consolidation always
increases social welfare. When κ < 2−√2, we can write the condition as:
αv
αc
<
κ√
2− 4κ+ κ2 (13)
This condition is depicted in Figure 2, together with the political feasibility
constraint which we derived in the previous section.
Consolidation increases welfare if the spillover effect is sufficiently large.
If κ > 1
2
, consolidation always increases welfare. A large spillover effect
implies that underprovision is severe under autonomy and makes it more
likely that public goods supply in both the city and the village increase after
consolidation. When the spillover effect is small, consolidation only increases
aggregate welfare if the village is small relative to the city. The intuition is
straightforward. The smaller the village, the smaller the increase in the tax
base, and hence the less severe the overprovision of public goods in the city
after consolidation. Moreover, when the village is small relative to the city,
it is more likely that consolidation increases public good provision in the
village, and hence partly resolves the underprovision problem in the village.
Clearly, villagers’ incentives to vote for consolidation are insufficient from a
social welfare point of view. The reason is that they do not take into account
the effect of consolidation on the welfare of the urbanites.
4 National transfers
The previous section showed that: i) autonomous districts underprovide pub-
lic goods; ii) consolidation does not solve (may even worsen) the problem of
underprovision in the smallest district and results in overprovision in the
largest district; iii) voters in the smallest district have insufficient incentives
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to vote for consolidation from a social welfare point of view. This section
examines how the national government may improve upon the decentralized
equilibrium outcome by conditioning national transfers to municipalities on
local characteristics. We assume that the national government can condi-
tion transfers to municipalities on population size and on the levels of public
goods that are provided. The national government does not observe the size
of the spillover effect in different regions. If it could condition transfers also
on the size of the spillover effect, the national government could generate any
level of public good provision (including first-best provision in all districts)
without creating any distortions. We feel that it is plausible to assume that
the national government lacks information about spillover effects in differ-
ent regions. We analyze the effects of two types of transfers: i) a transfer
that is conditional on the level of public goods and that must be spent on
public goods (earmarked transfers) and ii) a lump-sum transfer per munici-
pality. The earmarked transfer helps mitigating the underprovision problem.
The lump-sum transfer affects the incentives for consolidation and may thus
indirectly increase the allocative efficiency of public goods provision in the
economy.
4.1 Earmarked transfer
The national government gives a transfer of σ per unit of public good provided
in each municipality. The transfer is earmarked: it must be spent on the same
public good that it is conditioned on. The national government finances the
subsidy to local public good provision by means of a national income tax.
We assume that the number of municipalities is sufficiently large, such that
a single municipality’s decisions have a negligible effect on the national tax
rate. Hence, we can safely ignore the national tax in the analysis of local
public goods provision and consolidation of municipalities.
First consider autonomous districts. Maximizing (1) with respect to gi,
subject to the budget constraint (2), and recognizing that each unit of gi
delivers (1 + σ) gi through the transfer scheme, results in the equilibrium
level of public goods provision:
gai =
(
(1 + σ)αi
2p
)2
(14)
Comparing (7) with (14), it follows that the level of public goods increases in
the earmarked transfer. Similarly, when districts consolidate, public goods
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provision in equilibrium is:
guc =
(
(1 + σ) (αc + αv)
2p
)2
guv =
(
(1 + σ)κj (αc + αv)
2p
)2
It is easily verified that the earmarked transfer does not affect the incentives
to consolidate. The reason is that the transfer σ increases welfare under
the different regimes equiproportionally. For the same reason, the condition
under which consolidation is socially optimal is not affected by the level of
the earmarked transfer.
Earmarked transfers do not bring about socially optimal public goods
provision for at least two reasons. First, in regions where districts have
merged, earmarked transfers aggravate the problem of overprovision of public
goods in the largest district. Second, when spillover effects differ between
regions, a given level of σ is too low in some regions, while it is too high in
others. Hence, underprovision will persist in some regions, while earmarked
transfers cause overprovision in other regions.3 The optimal level of σ will
crucially depend on the exact distribution of κj’s over regions as well as on
the distribution of αv
αc
over regions.
4.2 Lump-sum transfer
Another, less direct way to enhance allocative efficiency of public goods pro-
vision is to promote consolidation of districts. As we saw in the previous
section, the villagers have insufficient incentive to consolidate from a social
welfare point of view. A simple way to strengthen the incentives to con-
solidate is to make a lump-sum transfer. Suppose the national government
provides a lump-sum transfer µ to each municipality. Villagers favor consol-
idation if: (
4κj − κ2j − 1
) αc + αv
4p
+
µ
αc + αv
>
αv
4p
+ κj
αc
2p
+
µ
αv
Clearly, µ < 0 promotes consolidation. A lump-sum tax which is equal for
all municipalities makes it more likely that villagers support consolidation as
consolidation enables them to share the tax with more people. It is easily
verified that if a lump-sum transfer does not change the decision on consolida-
tion, then the amounts of the public goods that are provided will not change.
3Conditioning σ on the population size of municipalities may help, but does not elimi-
nate these problems because of the differences in κ between regions.
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The reason is that the utility function is quasi-linear. Just like the earmarked
transfer, the lump-sum transfer is, however, not a distortion-free instrument.
Since the national government does not observe κj, the lump-sum tax is ei-
ther too low to induce consolidation in all cases in which consolidation is
socially desirable, and/or the lump-sum tax is so high that some small vil-
lages have an incentive to consolidate while it would be socially optimal to
remain autonomous. The optimal lump-sum transfer entails a trade off be-
tween these two effects and will crucially depend on the exact distribution of
κj over regions.
4
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we presented a model to study local public goods provision,
endogenous formation of municipalities, and the effects of transfers from
higher-level governments. A well-known result is that decentralized public
good provision leads to underprovision when there are positive spillovers. We
have shown that centralized public good provision may lead to overprovision
of local public goods in the largest district. Moreover, when the spillover
benefits are small, centralized provision may aggravate underprovision in the
smallest district. As a rule, there are insufficient incentives for consolidation
in the smallest district. A national government can alleviate above-mentioned
problems by implementing a transfer scheme. We have considered an ear-
marked transfer, acting upon the amounts of local public goods provided,
and a lump-sum transfer, affecting the incentives for consolidation. When
the national government is not fully informed about local preferences, these
transfers do not bring about the social optimum. Optimal transfers depend
crucially on the distribution of spillover effects over regions.
Our analysis can be extended in several important ways. Firstly, one
could drop the assumption that individuals are immobile, and introduce a
housing market, as in Calabrese, Cassidy, and Epple (2002). When mobility
is costless, housing prices in market equilibrium will be such that the utility of
urbanites and citizens is equal. The welfare effects of consolidation of the city
and the village will then be reflected in a change in relative housing prices.
Typically, individuals have a preference for living in a certain district and
4There exist more sophisticated transfer schemes to manipulate the incentives to unite,
where the transfers depend on the (relative) size of the village. Given that κ is not
observed by the national government, none of them will bring about the social optimum,
however. As for the earmarked transfer, the optimal scheme is dependent of the exact
distribution of κ over regions. We have attempted to derive optimal transfer schemes for
specific distributions, but we either failed to obtain a solution or felt that the solution did
not bring much additional insights.
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moving to another district is therefore costly to them. We conjecture that our
main results will still hold with mobile individuals as long as individuals are
heterogenous in preferences for living in a particular district. A nice feature
of this extension is that it could yield hypotheses that can be empirically
tested using housing prices before and after consolidation of municipalities.
Secondly, a threat of secession and the possibility of bargaining between
municipalities could be introduced in the model. Before consolidation, the
urbanites and villagers could attempt to agree upon levels of taxation and
public goods provision, which can be different from the unrestricted major-
ity voting outcome. Compliance is then enforced by the threat of secession
by one of the districts.5 Alternatively, consolidating districts could agree
on changing political decision-making rules, for example to require a super-
majority vote instead of a simple majority vote to pass a bill. As rules
for decision-making in local politics are typically determined at the national
level, such a local agreement would at best amount to a promise by one
party (the city) to take into account the interests of the other (the village)
in political decision-making after consolidation. Clearly, such a promise may
easily lack credibility. More generally, as Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) note
and anecdotal evidence suggests, the overall record of ‘cooperative federal-
ism’ has not been impressive. Strategic delegation by local jurisdictions may
be one reason for this (see Besley and Coate (2003) and Dur and Roelfsema
(2005)).
Thirdly, we have restricted our analysis to the issue of what would be
a socially optimal transfer scheme. Obviously, policy makers at the central
level who decide on the transfers may have other interests, either because
they represent mainly urbanites (or villagers), or because they are responsive
to lobbying efforts by local governments, as in Borck and Owings (2003),
or because they can use intergovernmental grants to win votes in districts
with many swing voters, as in Johansson (2003). It would be interesting to
examine the interplay between political decision making at the central level
and at the local level, taking into account the inefficiencies in local political
decision making that we identified in this paper. Likewise, politicians and
voters at the local level may have other motives for consolidation than those
stressed in our paper. Austin (1999) shows that the current decisive voter
may support consolidation so as to influence the identity of the decisive voter
in the future. His empirical analysis suggests that these political motives may
be more important than economic motives. Filer and Kenny (1980), on the
other hand, do find evidence that voters vote in line with their dollar benefits
5Le Breton and Weber (2003) have recently developed a model where transfers are used
to prevent secession by regions.
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of consolidation.
Lastly, the model could be extended so as to capture a number of other
features that appear to be important in political decision making on con-
solidation of municipalities and local public good provision, like asymmetric
spillovers (urbanites usually benefit less from public goods provision in the
village than villagers benefit from the city’s public goods), income hetero-
geneity, and economies of scale in public good production. While the latter
may imply that inhabitants of small villages are more favorable to consolida-
tion than suggested by our analysis, the former two tend to strengthen the
villager’s opposition.
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